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STA'FlEmNT OP THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The basic issue in this case is whether or not there is a point in time at which a property 
owner can be assured that a government entily will not reverse an official zoning delerinination 
and thwart the owner's home construction plans that had already been authorized by that same 
government entity. In this case, Respondent Michael Rollins ("Rollins") made a written request 
for a zoning determination from the Blaine County Planning and Zoning Administrator. In 
response, the Planning and Zoning Administrator issued an official written determination that 
Rollins' property was not in the mountain overlay district and, thus, would not require any 
special site alteration permit. Rollins relied on this determination and began to have building 
plans prepared for the construction of a residence on his property. Then, months later, he 
obtained a permit to excavate a driveway and prepare the building site. After Rollins 
commenced this work, a neighbor, Brian Poster ("Poster"), filed an appeal with Appellant Blaine 
County, seeking reconsideration of the zoning determination. Blaine County properly dismissed 
this appeal because it was not timely made. Then, apparently due to public pressure, Blaine 
County decided to allow Poster to bootstrap his appeal of the zoning determination to an appeal 
of the issuance of a subsequent building permit that related to the construction of the residence. 
After allowing this bootstrap appeal to proceed, Appellant reversed the zoning determination that 
had been made by the Planning and Zoning Administrator and forced Rollins to stop the 
previously approved construction. 
Rollins appealed to the district court. After reviewing the evidence and arguments of 
Rollins, Blaine County and Poster, who intervened in the appeal, the district court properly found 
that Blaine County was not permitted to reverse the Planning and Zoning Administrator's zoning 
decision because (I) under Blaine County's ordinances, Poster was not an "aggrieved person 
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with a right to appeal the zoning determination or the building permit; (2) even if Poster was an 
"aggrieved" person, his appeal of tbe zoning determination was not timely; (3) even if the zoning 
determination could be considered preliminary, Rollins incurred substantial costs in reliance on it 
and, therefore, established a non-conforming use of the property; and (4) even if Blaine County 
properly allowed Poster to appeal the building perinits issued to Rollins, it allowed those appeals 
to proceed before the wrong governing body. After finding that Blaine County had no 
reasonable basis in law or fact for allowing Poster to appeal the zoning determination, or for 
characterizing the zoning determination as "preliminary," the district court awarded costs and 
attorneys' fees to Rollins under Idaho Code Section 12-1 17. 
The County now appeals every finding made by the district couit The County, however, 
still has no reasonable basis in law or fact for its position that a third party can appeal an official 
zoning determination after the time for appeals has expired. Therefore, Blaine County's appeal 
should be denied in its entirety and Rollins should be awarded the fees and costs he has incurred 
in connection with this appeal. 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
A. Rollins Sought a Zoning Determination from Planning & Zoning. 
In 1997, Rollins purchased a piece of property.located at 107 East Fork Road in Blaine 
County, Idaho (the "Property") for the purpose of building a single-family home. (Agency R., 
Vol. 2, Ex. 62H at m1-2). The Property is a platted parcel located in a single-family residential 
zoning district on the north side of East Fork Road. (Id., at Ex. D). The Property consists of a 
hillside slope in excess of 15%, along with a bench area consisting of a slope of less than 15%. 
(Id., at Ex. E). It is on this bench area that Rollins wanted to buiid his home. (Id. at '39). 
In April 2004, Rollins began making plans for the construction of his home. (Id., at q[6) 
In doing so, Rollins consulted with an architect, engineer and various subcontractors. (Id.) One 
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of these consulta~lts suggested that Rollins request a determination from the Blaine County 
Planning & Zoning Administrator ("Administrator") as to whether or not the requirements of the 
Mountain Overlay District ("MOD) applied to the proposed building site. (Id.) This suggestion 
was prompted by a recent determination by the Administrator that an adjacent property was not 
subject to the MOD because its building site was located on a bench. (Id.) 
In response to this suggestion, Rollins met with the Administrator and explained his plans 
for constructing a home on the bench on the Property. (Id., at ¶ 7.) The Administrator informed 
Rollins that he could make a formal, written request for a determination as to whether the 
building site was subject to the MOD requirements. (Id.) On June 18, 2004, Rollins submitted a 
written request for a zoning determination. (Id. at Ex. D.) 
On July 6,2004, after reviewing a topographic map of the area and the engineering 
design of the proposed construction, the Administrator issued a written decision finding that the 
proposed construction site "does not fall within the definition of the MO District. Therefore, a 
site alteration permit is not required prior to application for a building permit for y o u  proposal." 
(Id. at m8-9 and Ex. E.) The Administrator reasoned that the proposed building site was a bench 
or terrace and, therefore, did not require a site alteration permit. (Id.) In coming to this 
conclusion, the Administrator and her staff debated the bench issue and found that it was 
consistent with the opposite side of the East Fork Canyon in that area. (R. at 69.) 
B. Rollins' Reliance on the July 6,2004 Determination. 
Relying on the Administrator's July 6, 2004 zoning determination, Rollins continued 
with his design plans and applied for an ApproachIAccess Permit from the County on November 
9,2004. (Agency R., Ex. 62H at ¶lo.) The following day, the permit was issued and Rollins 
was told by the Blaine County Road and Bridge Supervisor that Rollins could start the 
excavation of the driveway and building site. (Id.) Rollins also applied for approval of a septic 
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system. (Id., at ¶ I I.) On December 6, 2004, Rollins began the excavation work on the 
Property, which was then completed three weeks later. (Id., at ¶ 14.) On December 17,2004, 
Rollills submitted his application for a building permit to constl.uct the residence on the Property, 
which was not issued until April 21,2005. (Agency R. at 47-48). 
As of November 10,2004, Rollins had spent approximately $20,000 in prc-development 
planning and design work. (Id., at g12.) By the end of December, after completing the 
excavation work, Rollins had incurred ail additional $40,000 in costs. (Id., at 'j 13.) 
Furthermore. as of May 2005, Rollins also incurred liability under contracts for services and 
materials related to construction of his home in excess of $640,000.00. (Agency R. Ex. 62H at ¶ 
37.) 
C. The Poster Appeal. 
On December 28, 2004, almost six months after the Administrator issued its written 
decision that the Rollins Property is not subject to the MOD, Poster, a neighbor of the Property, 
filed an appeal of the Administrator's July 6,2004 decision. (Agency R., Ex. 63, Aff. of E. 
Lawson at Ex. 1.) The Commissioners correctly rejected the appeal as untimely for not having 
been filed within the twenty calendar days required by Blaine County Code $9-32-3(A). (Id.) 
Then, although the Commissioners properly found that Poster's appeal was untimely, Poster and 
the County came to an unusual agreement whereby the County decided that Poster could still 
appeal the July 6" determination by appealing any building permit that would have to be issued 
to Roliins to begin the construction of the residence. (R. at 66; Agency R. at 39; 45; 57-58). 
Consistent with the agreement reached with the Commissioners, on January 10,2005, 
Poster, through his counsel, requested that Planning & Zoning Department provide him notice of 
the issuance of any building permit to Rollins. (Agency R. at 57). Poster's counsel 
acknowledged in making the request for notice of issuance of a building permit that his client 
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was seeking to preserve his ability to challenge the Administrator's July 6,2004 decision, from 
which his right to directly appeal had been lost. (Agency R. at 57). Neither the County or Poster 
or their respective attorneys informed Rollins of this extraordinary agreement made between the 
County and Poster to enlarge Poster's time for appeal. (Agency R., Ex. 62H at 9[40.) 
On January 11,2005, after reviewing Rollins' building permit application, the 
Administrator sent Rollins a letter informing him that his proposed site plan did not meet setback 
requirements for the A-10 zoning district. (Agency R. Ex. 62H at Ex. H). Significantly, during 
this zoning review, the Administrator did not conclude that the Rollins Property is subject to the 
MOD. (Id.) In fact, on February 11,2005, the Administrator filled out the Building Permit 
Zoning Review/Information Sheet in which she noted that the Property was not in the MOD "per 
Kelsey letter 7/6/04." (Id., at Ex. J.) Rollins later submitted revised plans complying with the 
setback requirements. (Agency R. Ex. 62H at 2 18.) 
On January 25,2005, Tim Graves, the Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, sent a letter to 
Rollins stating that Poster had filed a lawsuit against Blaine County with regard to the Property. 
(Agency R. Ex. 62L) In that letter, Mr. Graves wrote that "any further improvements on the 
property are undertaken at [Rollins'] risk since the status of [Rollins'] County approvals have 
been placed in jeopardy by the filing of this court action." (Id.) This "court action" referred to 
by Mr. Graves pertained only to Poster's appeal of the County's determination that his appeal of 
the July 6" zoning determination was not timely because it was not made in the twenty day's 
mandated by Blaine County Code 9-32-3. Notably, Mr. Graves again did not inform Rollins of 
the County's agreement with Poster that would enable him to bootstrap his appeal of the zoning 
determination to an appeal of a building permit. (Id.) 
On April 4, 2005, the Building Official required Rollins to fill out an application, and pay 
a separate fee of $1,440.19, for a separate building permit to build a retaining wall. (Agency R. 
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Ex. 62H at Ex. I and Y[ 27.) Rollins did not request this building permit, and was told by Bill 
Dyer, the Building Official, that the County had never previously required a separate building 
perinit for a retaining wall from any other owner. (Id.) On April 5, 2005 the Building Official 
issued a building permit to Rollins to construct the retaining wall. (Id.) 
The same day the wall permit was issued, the Administrator sent written notice to Poster 
of the issuance of the permit. (Agency R. at 50). The very next day, on April 6,2005, Poster, 
through counsel, filed a written Notice of Appeal and Request for Stay appealing the April 5, 
2005 decision to issue the building permit to Rollins for the retaining wall. (Agency R. at 39). 
After receiving this appeal, the Commissioners met, without informing Rollins or giving him an 
opportunity to be heard, and decided on April 13,2005 to issue a stay of the building permit for 
the retaining wall. (Agency R. at 19.) 
On April 21,2005, more than four months after Rollins first applied, the Building 
Official issued a permit to Rollins for the construction of his home. (Agency R. Ex. 62G at Item 
5.) Once again, the Administrator sent written notice to Poster of the issuance of the building 
permit for the Rollins home on the same day it was issued. (Agency R. at 45). Poster, through 
counsel, filed an appeal of the decision to issue the building permit for the home on April 26, 
2005. (Agency R. at 29). 
D. The Commissioners' Decision. 
Poster's two appeals were consolidated for hearing before the Board of Commissioners 
("Commissioners") on May 26,2005. (Agency R. at 15.) In allowing the appeal to be heard, the 
Commissioners inherently determined that although Poster's December 28,2004 appeal of the 
July 6" zoning determination was not timely filed, the July fjth zoning determination could still 
be challenged through an appeal of a building permit that was later issued. 
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Following the hearing before the Commissioners, they issued a decision on June 23,2005 
(the "Board's Decision") reversing the July 6, 2004 zoning deterinination by the Administrator 
and finding instead that the Rollins Property is subject to the requirements of the MOD. 
(Agency R. at 4.) In the Board's Decision, the Colnmissioners for the first time found that 
written zoning determinations made by the Administrator are not final until a building permit is 
issued. (Agency R. at 7.) Thus, although the July 6'h zoning determination had a definitive 
appeal period for Roilins, the Colnlnissioners held that it was nothing more than a preliminary 
finding by the Administrator with regard to all other persons who may be upset by the decision. 
The Commissioners further determined that the Administrator's confirmation on February 11, 
2005 that the Properly was not in the MOD, which was made in connection with her review of 
Rollins' application for a building permit, was also merely preliminary until the building permit 
was physically issued. (Agency R. at 7.) In the Board's Decision, the Commissioners also found 
that they had jurisdiction to hear the appeal even though, under the Blaine County Code, appeals 
from the issuance of building permits go to the Board of Appeals and not the Board of County 
Commissioners. (Agency R. at 7-8.) The Commissioners then went on to disagree with the 
Administrator's findings regarding.the existence of a bench on the Property. (Id. at 9.) 
E. Rollins' Appeal to the District Court. 
On July 15,2005, following the issuance of the Board's Decision, Rollins appealed to the 
District Court. (R. at 1.) Poster intervened in the appeal on August 24, 2005. (Id. at 23.) 
1. Augmentation of the Record. 
On September 20,2005, December 20,2005 and March 20,2006, Rollins moved to 
augment the record and pursue additional discovery necessary to determine if the Commissioners 
had prejudged the Poster appeal prior to the hearing. (R. at 29, R. at 455 at Ex. 3, R. at 235.) 
The district court granted Rollins' request to take two depositions and pursue a public records 
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request for records from Blaine County. (R. at 139.) Then, after Rollins obtained this discovery, 
he sought to augment the record with: 
(1) satellite photographs of the Property and the neighboring properties; 
(2) several other decisions made by the Administrator regarding MOD zoiling issues 
prior to the Commissioners' hearing on the Poster appeal; 
(3) several other decisions made by the Administrator regarding MOD zoning issues 
after the Commissioners' hearing on the Poster appeal; 
(4) affidavits of Rollins and his counsel containing evidence of the Commissioners' 
potential bias against Rollins, including the deposition transcripts of Blaine 
County Commissioner, Tom Bowman, and County Engineer, Jim Koonce; 
(5) an affidavit of the Administrator regarding the process utilized for making the 
zoning determination of the Property; 
(6) an engineering study of slopes and bench areas on lots similar to the Property; 
(7) an excerpt from the Comprehensive Planning Guide; 
(8) topographical maps of neighboring properties; and 
(9) letters sent to the County before the hearing that were in support of the Rollins' 
proposed home. 
(R. at 455 at Ex. 3, R. at 183.) After hearing the argument of the parties, and the stipulation of 
Rollins to withdraw its request to augment the record with the post-hearing decisions of the 
Administrator regarding MOD zoning issues, the district court properly granted Rollins' motion 
to augment. (R. at 245.) In coming to this ruling, the district courl found - as required by Idaho 
Code 367-5276 -that the evidence either had not been presented by Rollins at the hearing due 
for good reasons, or related to alleged irregularities in the proceedings below. (See March 24, 
2006 Tr. at 185.) 
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The district court also allowed Rollins to augment the record with evidence relating to 
whether or not the Rollins' Property was in the MOD because Poster had not identified that as an 
issue in his original notice of appeal to the Administrator. (R. at 256.) Therefore, the district 
court properly found that there were good reasons for Rollins' failure to present the evidence at 
the hearing before the Commissioners. (Id.) 
On October 4,2005, Blaine County moved to augment the record with seven different 
pieces of evidence, including (1) disclosures of ex park contacts by the Commissioners; (2) the 
December 28,2004 notice of appeal by Poster; (3) the January 10,2005 letter from Poster's 
counsel to the Administrator; (4) Poster's original appeal to the district court regarding the 
County's denial of his first appeal of the July 6" zoning determination; and (5) a January 18, 
2005 letter from Poster's counsel to Mr. Graves. (R. at 44.) This unopposed motion was granted 
on October 20,2005. (R. at 136.) 
2. The Bifurcation of Rollins' District Court Appeal. 
After augmenting the record, the district court determined that the Commissioners should 
have an opportunity to review the new evidence and decide if such evidence affected its decision 
to reverse the July 6th zoning determination made by the Administrator. Thus, on April 7, 2006, 
the district court entered an Order Governing Further Proceedings in which it ordered the 
following: 
r The district court would retain and resolve all issues relating to the timeliness, 
validity and legality of Poster's appeal to the Commissioners. 
The district court would retain Rollins' estoppel argument as it related to 
timeliness of Poster's appeal and related to the actions of Blaine County. 
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The parties would meet and conSer to settle the record as to which facts or 
documents contained in the augmented record that the district court could 
consider on the retained portion of the appeal. 
The non-retained issues were remanded to Blaine County for reconsideration in 
light of the augmented record. 
(R. at 248.) In June 2006, the parties stipulated and district court ordered that the district court 
could consider any information contained in the original record and the deposition of Tom 
Bowman, subject to a reservation of the right of the parties' to object. (R. at 263.) 
3. The District Court's Decision. 
On October 18, 2006, after briefing and argument, the district court issued its Decision on 
Petition for Judicial Review (the "Court Decision"). In the Court Decision, the district court 
reversed the Board's Decision on several different grounds. The grounds for the reversal include 
the following: 
Poster had no right to appeal the July 6th zoning determination because the Blaine 
County ordinances did not confer upon him any due process rights, including a 
right to notice or to be heard. (R. at 350,355.) 
* Even if Poster had a right to appeal the,July 6th zoning determination, his appeal 
was not made in timely manner. (R. at 357.) 
* The County could not reverse the July 6" zoning determination because the 
decision was not "preliminary," as the County argued, and Rollins, in good faith, 
expended significant funds in reliance upon the determination. (R. at 359.) 
Even if the County properly allowed Poster to appeal the July 61h zoning 
determination, such appeal should have proceeded before a Board of Appeals, not 
the Board of County Commissioners. (R. at 365.) 
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On October 26, 2006, Rollins filed a motion for an award of fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 17, which allows an award of fees upon a finding that a County acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. Before any hearing could be conducted on this issue, the 
County filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court Decision on November 8,2006. (R. at 410.) The 
County then opposed Rollins' motion for fees and costs primarily on the grounds that (1) the 
district court puiportedly lacked jurisdiction because the County had already filed a notice of 
appeal of the Court Decision, and (2) the County believed it had acted with a reasonable basis in 
fact and law. The district court rejected these arguments and granted Rollins the fees and costs 
he incurred only in connection with the petition. (R. at 435.) It declined to award any of the fees 
Rollins incurred in connection with the hearing before the Commissioners. (Id.) 
As set forth in detail below, each of the grounds set forth in the Court Decision was an 
appropriate and proper basis for the district court's reversal of the Board's Decision. 
Furthermore, because there was no reasonable basis in fact or law for the County's determination 
that Poster had appeal rights of a zoning determination request made by Rollins, or for its 
inexplicable decision to suddenly claim that zoning determinations are preliminary until a 
building permit is issued, an award of fees and costs to Rollins was appropriate. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court correctly found that Poster had no right to appeal the 
July 6th zoning determination or the building permits issued to Rollins. 
2. Whether the district court correctly found that Poster's appeal of the July 6th 
zoning dete~mination was not timely made. 
3. Whether the district court correctly found that the County could not revoke the 
Administrator's zoning determination because Rollins relied on it in good faith and incurred 
significant expenses prior to the attempted revocation. 
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4. Whether the district court correctly found that the Board of County 
Commissio~lers lacked jurisdictio~l to hear Postcr's appeal of Rollins' building permits. 
5. Whether the district court's augmentation of the record was proper and, if not, 
was it even relevant to the district court's reversal of the Board's Decision. 
6. Whether the district court's award of attorneys' fees to Rollins was proper. 
7. Whether Rollins should be awarded his fees and costs incurred in responding to 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
In reviewing an appeal of a district court's judicial review of a local land use decision 
under the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act, this Court reviews the decision independently of 
the district court's decision. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84 (2003). This 
Court shall affirm the decision of the local agency, such as a Board of Commissioners, unless it 
determines that the Commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions (1) violated 
the constitution or statutory provisions; (2) exceeded its statutory authority; (3) were made upon 
unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by substantial evidence on the record; or (5) were 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id.; LC. 5 67-5279(3). 
In this case, the district court found that the County violated its own ordinances by 
allowing Poster to appeal the July 6" zoning determination through an appeal of the building 
permits, declaring the July 6th determination to be preliminary, and allowing the Poster appeal to 
be heard by an unauthorized body. The Court exercises free review in interpreting Blaine 
County's ordinances and determining whether violations of these ordinances occurred. Arthur, 
v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 859,993 P.2d 617,622 (Ct. App. 2000); Friends of Farm to 
Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
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Il. THE DISTRICT COURT P%OPERLY POUND 'GNAT POSTER HAD NO 
RIGHT TO APPEAL THE JULY 6TH ZONING DETERMIINATBONP1l 
In the Court's Decision, the district court first found that Poster did not have the right to 
appeal the July 6" zoning determination because he was not an "aggrieved" person as that term 
is defined by the Blaine County ordinances. In coming to this conclusion, the district court first 
correctly noted that the right to appeal is conferred only by legislative authority. Evans State 
Bank v. Skeen, 30 Idaho 703, 167 P. 1165 (1917). Thus, unless the Blaine County ordinances 
provided Poster with a right to appeal the July 6" zoning determination, the Commissioners 
should not have conducted their review of that decision. 
In its Opening Brief, Blaine County contends that the Court should look only at Blaine 
County Code Section 9-32-3 to determine whether Poster had a statutory right to appeal the 
zoning determination. (Brief at 15.) This ordinance, which pertains to an appeal from a decision 
made by the Administrator regarding zoning issues, provides as follows: 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Administrator made in interpreting or 
enforcing this Title may appeal such a decision to the Board by filing a notice of 
appeal with the Board within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of such 
decision, stating the date and nature of the decision appealed form and the 
grounds for the appeal. 
The County argues that, if this ordinance is read in a vacuum, Poster was a person aggrieved by 
the zoning determination because he is an adjacent property owner who did not like the decision. 
Thus, the County concludes in a simple manner, Poster was statutorily entitled to appeal the 
Administrator's determination that the Property was not in the MOD.' 
1 The County also determined that Poster was entitled to appeal the July 6Ih zoning determination 
even though the twenty-day period had expired because it creatively decided that the written zoning 
determination was only "preliminary." Thus, the County effectively held that the Blaine County 
ordinances allow a zoning determination to be appealed by any person unhappy with a zoning decision 
every time an application to make any alterations to a piece of property is filed with the County. The 
fallacy of th'is argument is addressed below in Section 111. 
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The district court, however, found that Blaine County Code Section 9-32-3 must be read 
in conjunction with the other Blaine County zoning ordinances that make reference to appeal 
rights. This finding was correct given that the Court applies the same principles in construing 
lnunicipal ordinances as it does in the constructioil of statutes. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold 
Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126, 136 (2007). Therefore, the objective in 
interpreting an ordinance is to derive the intent of the legislative body that enacted it. Id. In 
deriving this intent, "language of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all 
sections of applicable statues must be construed together so as to determine the legislature's 
intent. Id., quoting Friends of Farm to Market, supra, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14. 
In determining the legislative intent regarding the phrase "person aggrieved," the district 
court looked first to Blaine County Code Section 9-21-4, which sets forth the categorical 
exclusions for the MOD. Under subsection "C" of Section 9-21-4, the Administrator is required 
to review all written requests for a determination of a categorical exclusion to the MOD 
regulations. The ordinance provides that the "administrator shall issue a written decision within 
thirty-one (31) days of receipt of an application for determination of categorical exclusion." 
Importantly, the County admits that only the applicant has the right to receive notice of this 
written decision.2 (R. at 296.) The ordinance then provides that "any person aggrieved by the 
written decision of the administrator as to a categorical exclusion may appeal the administrator's 
decision to the board according to the procedures and time requirements of section 9-32-3 of this 
title." Given that the County admits that the ordinance requires notice of the written decision to 
be given only to the applicant, the district court correctly found that the County intended that 
2 In fact, the County stated at the August 7, 2006 hearing on Rollins' appeal to the district court 
that "these determinations [by the Administrator] are made on a daily basis throughout the county, and it 
would be an immense burden on the county as well as the applicants who would be required to pay for 
such notice, to require notice of every one of those determinations be sent out to potentially aggrieved 
parties." (Aug. 7, 2006 Tr. at 79.) 
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only the applicant would be a "person aggrieved" by that written notice, which impliedly would 
occur only if the decision denied the existence of a categorical exclusion to the MOD. 
This finding was further buttressed by the district court's review of Blaine County Code 
Section 9-3-5, which pertains to appeals of building permit applications. Subsection "B" of this 
ordinance provides that the Administrator shall review all applications for building or other 
permits. The ordinance further provides: 
If the administrator determines that a permit or application is incomplete or 
requires application for an additionalpermit, the administrator shall so notify the 
applicant in writing. Any person aggrieved by such written notice from the 
administxator may appeal the administrator's decision to the board according to 
the procedures and time requirements of Section 9-32-3 of this title. 
(emphasis added.) Thus, under the building permit ordinance, only the applicant is entitled to 
notice of the Administrator's decision on a permit application and only a person "aggrieved by 
such written notice" that the application is incomplete or requires an additional permit - such as 
a site alteration permit - may appeal that decision. Again, the district court correctly found that 
the County purposefully chose not to give written notice of every building permitlzoning 
decision to anyone who might be aggrieved by the decision. Instead, the County clearly intended 
that only those people that received the written notice setting forth the inadequacies in the 
application could be "aggrieved" by it, and, thus, were entitled to appeal it. Notably, there is no 
provision in this section allowing anyone to appeal the issuance of a building permit - it only 
pertains to the denial of an application. 
From the totality of these ordinances, the district court correctly determined that the local 
legislature did not intend to give every person administrative appeal rights for every decision 
made by the Administrator - a finding that is not even contested by the County in its Opening 
Brief. Instead, Sections 9-3-5 and 9-21-4 define who may appeal an adverse determination of 
the Administrator regarding a building permit or a MOD categorical exclusion, respectively. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15 
Then, Section 9-32-3 -the sole ordinance relied on by the County to support its decision to allow 
Poster to appeal the July 6" zoning determination - defines the appeal process that is to be used 
by a person who is authorized to appeal a determination. This interpretation of the Blaine 
County ordinaxes is necessary not only given the wording of the statutes, but also because the 
County has acknowledged that it would be overwhelmed if it allowed any person that disagreed 
with a decision made by the Administrator to appeal that decision to the Board of 
Commissioners. If the County were to provide due process rights to every possible aggrieved 
person, it would have to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before issuing any 
building pennit. Then, it would subject itself to being a party to appeals, such as the one at hand. 
The County sought to avoid this very type of legal process when it enacted ordinances that allow 
only the applicant to appeal a zoning determination. 
As set forth above, in its attempt to find a basis for reversing the July 6'h zoning 
determination, the County skipped a step in making its finding that Poster was entitled to appeal 
it. Instead of analyzing whether Poster had appeal rights under Section 9-3-5 or 9-21-4, the 
County went directly to the ordinance that sets forth the appeal process and summarily concluded 
that Poster was aggrieved because he owned adjacent property. Poster, however, was not a 
person who submitted a written request for a zoning determination on the Property and 
subsequently received notice of an adverse nature. As a result, he was not entitled to notice of 
the Administrator's July 6" decision. Since he was not entitled to notice of that written 
determination, he was not a person authorized by the Blaine County ordinances to appeal it. 
Therefore, because the County acted in violation of its own statutes when it allowed Poster to 
appeal the Administrator's July 6" zoning determination, the district court's reversal of the 
Commissioner's decision should be upheld. 
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1HI. 'FHE D1SlfRIICT COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT POSTER'S 
APPEAL, HP STATUTOltIILY AUTHORIZED, WAS UNTHmLY. 
The next basis for the district court's reversal of the Board's Decision granting Poster's 
appeal of the July 6th zoning determination was that it was not filed within tlte statutory time 
frame. Blaine County Code Section 9-32-3(A) expressly provides that any decision by the 
Administrator in interpreting the zoning ordinances may be appealed "by filing a notice of appeal 
with the Board within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of such decision, . . ." (emphasis 
added.) Thus, even if Poster was a statutorily "person aggrieved" by the July 6th zoning 
determination, he was required to file a notice of appeal no later than July 26,2004. Since Poster 
failed to do so, the district court correctly found that his appeal should never even been heard by 
the Board. 
Incredibly, the County itself confirmed the propriety of the district court's determination 
of untimeliness. On December 28,2004, Poster filed his first appeal with the Board seeking to 
reverse the Administrator's determination that the Property was not in the MOD. The Board of 
Commissioners denied this appeal in a January 5, 2005 letter to Poster because he had failed to 
file the notice of appeal within twenty days. (Agency R., Ex. 63, Aff. of E. Lawson at Ex. 1.) 
This letter denying the Poster appeal should have been the end of Poster's attempts to reverse the 
July 6" zoning decision. Unfortunately, it was not. Instead, the Commissioners set out on a 
mission to find a way - any way - to reverse the July 6'h zoning determination. As set forth 
below, however, not one of the rationales put forth by the County to justify its reversal are 
supported by a reasonable interpretation of Idaho or Blaine County law. 
A. The County's Contention that the July 6" Zoning Decision was 
"Preliminary" is Without Merit. 
The first argument made by the County in defense of its complete reversal of position 
regarding the time for appealing the July 6'h zoning determination is that is was merely a 
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preliminary decision that did uot become final until a building permit was issued. Based on this 
creative argument, the Coinmissioners informed Poster that he could appeal the July 6' zoning 
determination by appealing any building permit that may be issued to Rollins in the future. That 
is, the Board decided - without giving any notice or opportunity to be heard to Rollins - that 
Poster's time to appeal could be enlarged because the building permit application requires the 
Administrator to assess the zoning status of the property sought to be developed. Thus, the 
County rationalizes, because the Administrator is required to determine whether the requested 
use i11 a building permit application "is subject to provisions of this code relating to a special use 
overlay district or requires an additional special use, conditionai use or other permit," the 
Administrator's July 6" written decision was simply preliminary and could be altered at any time 
until the building permit was issued. (Opening Brief at 16.) As set forth below, this argument is 
faulty for at least three reasons. 
First, there can be only one point in time at which a decision becomes final, and, thus, 
appealable. In Re Quesnell Dairy, 143 Idaho 691,694, 152 P.3d 562,565 (2007) (an agency 
"must be clear in indicating when the decision is final and hence, appealable"). If a decision is 
merely preliminary, it cannot be appealed, and vise versa, if it is final, it can be appealed. In this 
case, the July 6th zoning determination had a statutory.time deadline for Rollins to file an appeal 
- ergo, it was final. As the district court noted, it is simply not possible for the zoning decision 
to be final as to Rollins and not final as to the County or any other "person aggrieved" by the 
decision. If a decision is final as to one party, it is final as to all parties. Therefore, the County's 
position that "the determination of zoning compliance did not become final until the building 
permits were actually issued on April 5,2005 and April 21,2005" was clearly erroneous. 
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Second, the July 6'" zoning determination makes no mention that it was preliminary in 
any manner. (Agency R., Ex. 621-1 at Ex. E.) To the contrary, the Administrator's letter to Mr. 
Rollins states: 
Based upon this assessment, you are not required to obtain a hillside site alteration 
permit prior to application for or issuance o f a  building permit by Blaine County. 
All other reviews and approvals will be required, however, and all other code 
requirements are required to be met. . . . Please understand also, though no 
changes are expected in the near future, this determination is based upon the 
codes as they currently exist. Changes to tbe code may affect a future decision for 
this project. 
(emphasis added.) Thus, the Administrator informed Rollins that he was not required to obtain a 
special site permit prior to obtaining a building permit. Further, she informed him that the 
determination would not change unless there was a change in the zoning code. For the County to 
claim that this language constituted a preliminary finding that could be changed during the 
building permit application review process is simply outrageous. 
Third, even if the Administrator's July 6" zoning determination could be characterized as 
a preliminary decision, it should have been declared final on November 9,2004 when the County 
issued the first permit to Rollins, which allowed him to excavate the road and prepare the 
building site. (Agency R., Ex. 62H at Ex. F.) In fact, it was declared final by the Commissioners 
in early January 2005 when they informed Poster that.his December 28,2004 appeal was 
untimely. At the very latest, it should have been declared final when, on February 11, 2005, the 
Administrator approved Rollins' building permit application subject to certain conditions3 and 
noted that the Property was not in the MOD "per Kelsey letter 7/6/04.'; 
For these reasons, the County's reliance on the "preliminary" nature of the July 6" zoning 
determination for its decision to allow the Poster appeal to proceed must be rejected. The 
decision was final and unappealable by anyone after July 26, 2004. 
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I%. The McVickers Case does not Alter the Finality of the Zoning 
Determination. 
The County next attempts to buttress its argument that the July 6Ih zoning determination 
was inerely a preliminary decision that could he appealed by Poster through an appeal of the 
issuance of a building permit by relying on this Court's decision in McVicker v. City of Lewiston, 
134 Idaho 34,995 P.2d 804 (2000). The County claims that McVicker stands for the proposition 
that the issuance of a building permit in every county in Idaho is an administrative interpretation 
of a zoning ordinance from which any unhappy neighbor may appeal. (Opening Brief at 16.) In 
fact, the County submits that the McVicker Court implicitly held that Idaho's "cities and counties 
should construe their ordinances in a manner that favors giving an aggrieved party the 
opportunity to present their objections to the governing board." (Id.) Relying on ihis purported 
implicit holding, the County argues that, if neighbors should he allowed to appeal the issuance of 
a building permit, they must be able to appeal the zoning determination that is part of the 
application review, regardless of when that zoning determination was made. 
A review of the McVicker case, however, establishes that the Court did not hold that all 
cities and counties must allow a neighbor to appeal the issuance of a building permit. Nor did 
the McVicker Court find that a written zoning determination is preliminary until a building 
permit is issued. Instead, in McVicker, the Court was faced with interpreting the Lewiston City 
Code - and only that city's code - to determine whether the issuance of a building permit 
constituted a "ruling" since, under the City's code, any affected person was given the right to 
appeal a ruling. 
In that case, McVicker owned property next to property owned by Cook. Cook applied 
to the Lewiston community development department for a building permit to construct a building 
3 The building permit was then denied a month later because Rollins submitted new plans that 
addressed the Administrator's concerns about the setbacks. 
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for the purpose of parking "p1easu1:e vehicles." Pr io~ to the issuance of the building permit, 
McVicker met with the head of Lewiston's building department, who informed him that Cook 
planned to build an accessory building that could not be used for commercial purposes because 
the neighborhood was zoned residential. On November 8, 1996, the community development 
department issued the building pennit for the building. On November 13, 1996, McViclter 
delivered a letter to the city manager, with copies to the city attorney and the head of the building 
department, objecting to the size and location of the building. On January 26, 1997, McVicker 
filed an appeal with the Lewiston planning and zoning commission, contesting the size and 
asserting a violation of the setback requirements. This appeal was rejected by the community 
development director as being untimely because more than fifteen days had passed since the 
building permit was issued. 
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City, the McVicker 
Court first addressed the issue of whether McVicker had been required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before applying for judicial review. The Lewiston City Code provided 
that "an appeal from a ruling of the community development department inay be made in writing 
to the (planning and zoning) commission by an affected person within 15 days of the ruling." 
McVicker argued that he was not required to appeal the issuance of the building permit to the 
planning and zoning comlnission because it was not a "ruling" under the Lewiston City Code. 
The Court rejected this argument. Although "ruling" was not a defined term, the Court 
determined that "the community development department's issuance of a permit is an 
administrative interpretation of the Lewiston zoning ordinance and may properly be deemed a 
ruling." Id. at p. 807. Thus, under the Lewiston City Code, the issuance of a building permit was 
a ruling that could be appealed by any affected person. 
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Importantly, the McVicker Court did not hold that every local ordinance provides a 
neighbor with the right to appeal the issuance of a building permit. In fact, the Court never 
addressed the issue of who is an "affected person" under the Lewiston Code, or any other 
locality's ordinances. Thus, while the Court implicitly held that a neighbor may be an "affected 
person" under the Lewiston Code, the Court certainly did not find that Blaine County's Code 
defines a "person aggrieved" as any neighbor who dislikes the Administrator's decision. To the 
contrary, as set forth above, the Blaine County Code provides that the Administrator shall give 
written notice of a zoning or building permit determination only to the applicant, who may then 
appeal that decision if he or she is aggrieved by it. 
The County next argues that the McVicker Court gave a neighbor appeal rights despite a 
"substantial lack of compliance with the appeal procedure called for in the city code." (Opening 
Brief at 17.) Notably, the Court did not find that McVicker failed to substantially comply with 
the appeal procedure set forth in the Lewiston Code. To the contrary, the Court found that 
MeVicker's November 13, 1996 letter of protest to the city manager and the head of the 
community development department constituted a request to appeal the building permit. As the 
Court noted, although the letter did not contain the word "appeal" in it, it clearly set forth 
MeVicker's dissatisfaction with the department's decision and his desire to have it reversed. 
Thus, the Court found that, under its interpretation of the Lewiston City Code, the McVicker's 
November 13th letter substantially complied with the Code and constituted a timely request to 
appeal the building permit that was issued on November 8". 
In this case, Poster never made even an arguably timely request to appeal the July 6" 
zoning determination. Thus, even if the Blaine County Code could be interpreted to give Poster 
the right to appeal a zoning determination, he failed to comply with the twenty-day time 
limitation contained in the County Code. He, therefore, cannot be permitted to bootstrap an 
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untimely appeal of the July 6th zoning determination to an appeal of Rollins' two building permit 
applications. See Enright v. Blaine Courzfy, 127 Idaho 498,903 P.2d 87 (1995) (Court held that 
downstream owners' appeal of a conditional use permit granted to another property owner to 
build in the floodplain was barred because it was not filed in a timely manner even though the 
downstream owners did not receive actual notice of the perinit application). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMTNED THAT THE 
COUNTY COULD NOT ALTER ITS ZONING DECISION SINCE 
ROELINS RELIED ON IT IN GOOD FAITH. 
In addition to reversing the Board's Decision on the grounds that Poster did not have the 
right to appeal the July 6" zoning determination and, even if he did, he failed to do so in a timely 
manner, the district court also held that the County could not reverse the zoning decision because 
Rollins had relied on it in good faith. Specifically, after Rollins obtained the written July 6" 
zoning determination, he proceeded to have the designs prepared for his residence and he 
engaged engineers and excavators to assist in the driveway and site excavation. The 
uncontroverted evidence establishes that Rollins spent approximately $60,000 from the time of 
the zoning determination until he received the letter from Deputy Prosecutor Tim Graves 
informing him that Poster would likely file an appeal of any building permit issued for the 
Property. (Agency R., Ex. 62H at 12-13.) The district court found that, due to these 
substantial expenditures made by Rollins, Rollins had established a non-conforming use on the 
Property that could not be disallowed by the Commissioners a year later by reversing the July 6Ih 
zoning determination. 
To support this finding, the district couft relied on the Court's ruling in Boise City v. 
Blaser, 98 Idaho 789,572 P.2d 892 (1977). In Blaser, a developer obtained a zoning certificate 
from Ada County that was the equivalent of a Boise City unconditional building permit. The 
developer proceeded to perform grading and excavation work, but stopped after a few months 
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due to unusually incleme~nt weather. During the developer's volul~tary stoppage, the City of 
Boise annexed the property illto the City. After the developer started the excavation work again, 
the City posted a stop work ordcr because no city building permit had been obtained. The City 
then filed a lawsuit seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the developer from coiltinuing 
without a City building permit. hl ul~holding the trial court's refusal to enter the requested 
injunction, the Blaser Court reasoned that "when a city, by annexation, enacts a new zoning 
ordinance to govern what was previously county land, it must respect existing non-confirming 
uses." (Id, at 791.) In balancing private property rights with a municipality's right to exercise its 
police power, the Court found that, 
while a landowner who merely obtains a building permit is not protected against a 
future zoning change, he will be protected if, in reliance on the permit or on the 
existing zoning, he has made substantial expenditures or otherwise committed 
himself, to his substantial disadvantage, before the zoning is changed. 
(Id., citing Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13,20 (1973); see also City of Lewiston v. Bergamo, 119 Idaho 
221,804 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1990) (court rejected claim lhat a repair shop constituted a 
preexisting nonconforming use because virtually all of the owners' expenses were incurred afer 
the City annexed the property and altered the zoning classification). 
The district court correctly found that the Blaser holding "governs precisely the 
circumstances of this case" because Rollins obtained an official zoning determination from the 
Administrator, relied on that zoning determination by making substantial expenditures and would 
be disadvantaged if the zoning were allowed to be changed. (R. at 358.) The County, however, 
objects to this basis for reversing the Board's Decision, contending that Blaser and Bergamo do 
not apply to the facts of this case. Instead, the County argues that the Blaser and Berganzo 
decisions apply only to cases involving work that was done under previously issued building 
permits, which would then be considered nonconforming after an annexation. (Opening Brief at 
19.) That is, the County contends that it can be estopped from changing the Administrator's 
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zoning determination only if it had annexed the Rollins Property after another municipality had 
issued a building permit to roll in^.^ There is, however, no basis for this incredibly narrow 
reading of the Court's holdings in Blaser and Bergamo. Indeed, in recognizing the need to 
balance the rights of property owners with the government's police power, the Blaser Court 
sought to avoid the situation in which a property owner is given permission to proceed with 
development plans, and then does so, only to be told later by a governmental entity that the 
zoning code no longer allows that type of development. 
In this case, the Administrator informed Rollins in an official written determination that 
he could build on the bench area of his lot because it was not in the MOD. Notably, this decision 
was not some rogue or inappropriate action taken by a member of the Planning and Zoning Staff. 
To the contrary, the Planning and Zoning staff debated the issue and together reached the 
decision that the Property was not in the MOD - a decision that was consistent with the 
Administrator's zoning decisions on the opposite side of the East Fork Canyon in the 
neighboring area. (R. at 69.) Relying on this official zoning decision,'~ollins incurred 
substantial development expenses, including obtaining a permit from the County to excavate the 
road to his building site and prepare that site, and filing for building permits for a retaining wall 
and the home. Then, after he incurred these substantial costs, the County attempted to change 
the zoning that covered the Property in a manner that would preclude Rollins from building his 
home on the Property. That is, the County sought to change the way in which the bench 
4 Given the County's admission that the doctrine of estoppel can be applied against a government 
entity when land is annexed, its claim that the "doctrine of estoppel is not applied in Idaho in the zoning 
context" is baffling. (Opening Brief at 17.) Indeed, even its citation to Harrell v. City oflewiston, 95 
Idaho 243,506 P2d 470 (1973) does not support this contention. To the contrary, the Harrell Court stated 
that estoppel has been allowed against municipalities when there was evidence of "expenditures of large 
sums of money and good faith reliance on lawful, affirmative acts of municipal officers or agents." Id., at 
248. Such is the case here where Rollins spent a large sum of money in good faith reliance on the lawful, 
affirmative act of the Administrator. The Narrell Court simply found there was no exigent reason for 
applying the estoppel doctrine in that case because the zoning of the property in question had never been 
properly changed by the City from agricultural to commercial. Id. at 249. 
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exception to the MOD had been historically applied. As set forth above, this is the very type of 
activity that the Blaser Court sought to avoid. The district court, therefore, properly found that 
the County was estopped from changing its interpretation of the MOD zoning ordinance. 
The County, however, argues that, even if it is subject to the doctrine of estoppel, the 
doctrine should not have been applied in this case because Rollins' reliance on the July 6th 
zoning determination was purportedly not reasonable or made in good faith. (Opening Brief at 
20.) The County attempts to justify this argument by claiming that Rollins was told by the seller 
of the Property in 1997 that he would need planning and zoning approval to build oil the 
Property and that Planning & Zoning then informed Rollins that the Property was in the MOD. 
From these facts, the County ascribes a laclc of good faith on Rollins' part and implies that he 
was somehow forum shopping to get a better zoning determi~ation.~ Rollins, however, did no 
such thing. Instead, in 2004, when he began preparing for the construction of a residence, a 
consultant suggested that he seek a determination from Planning & Zoning since there had been 
a recent determination that a neighboring property did not need a site alteration permit because 
the proposed building site was on a bench. (Agency R, Ex. 62H at 'F[ 6.) Based on this advice, 
and unaware if the zoning codes had changed in the past seven years, he sought a determination 
from Planning &Zoning as to whether his building site (not the entire lot) was in the MOD. He 
received the Administrator's determination that the proposed site was not within the MOD on 
July 6,2004. Given the fact that the Planning & Zoning staff debated the zoning of Roliins' site 
and applied a consistent interpretation of the MOD to it, Rollins had no reason to believe that the 
County would try to change the decision a year later - especially since the July 61h determination 
5 The County's assertion that Rollins somehow acted in bad faith because he "aggressively pursued 
work" on the Property after receiving the July 6" zoning determination is simply absurd. (Opening Brief 
at 20.) Why else would Rollins have sought the official zoning determination except for the purpose of 
proceeding with the construction? 
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staled that it was based on the codes as they currently existed and could change presumably only 
if the codes changed. (Id., at Ex. E.) 
The County further attempts to question Rollins' good faith by claiming that he 
proceeded with the work on his Property even though the County "warned him that Poster had 
filed a lawsuit. The County fails to aclcnowledge, however, that Rollins had already expended 
$60,000 in pre-development and excavation costs by the time the County sent Kiln h e  letter at 
the end of January 2005. Furthermore, the County had already rejected Poster's appeal of the 
zoning determination as being untimely. There was no reason for him to believe that the County 
would backtrack on this proper decision and allow Poster to appeal the same zoning 
determination through an appeal of his building permit. This "lack of good faith" argument, 
therefore, is totally without merit. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR POSTER'S 
APPEAL. 
As its final basis for reversing the Commissioners' Decision to hear Poster's appeal of 
Rollins' two building permits in which they reversed the Administrator's July 6" zoning 
determination, the district court found that the Commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal. As the district court noted, Title 7 of the Blaine County Code is the Building Code 
Ordinance. Section 7-1-3(B) provides that all building permit applications he on forms provided 
by the County and that approval shall be in accordance with Sections 9-3-5 and 9-3-6, which 
includes appeal rights for applicants aggrieved by a decision that an application is incomplete or 
requires a special permit. fn addition, however, the Blaine County Commissioners enacted 
Ordinance 7-1-3(1), which provides that "the board of county commissioners will appoint a three 
(3) person board to stand as the board of appeals, as needed, with membership to be selected 
from but not limited to the following list of professionals in the various fields of expertise in the 
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building industry . . ." These professionals include building officials, fire professionals, general 
contractors, architects and engineers. 
Thus, even if Poster had a right to appeal Rollins' building permits, the appeals were to 
be heard by a three-person board of building industry professionals, not the Board of 
Commissioners. As a result, the Cornnlissioners lacked jurisdiction. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AUGMENTATION OF TWE RECORD HAD 
NO BEARING ON ITS DECISION. 
Inexplicably, the County spends eleven pages of its Opening Brief discussing the 
district's court decision to augment the record below. Specifically, under Idaho Code Section 
67-5277, the district court allowed evidence relating to potential bias of the Commissioners, as 
well as other zoning determinations made by Planning & Zoning. The district court's order of 
augmentation was proper because, as it expressly found, there were good reasons for Rollins' 
failure to present the other zoning determinations at the hearing before the Commissioners (i.e., 
his request for public records from the County had been ignored) and the allegation of bias was 
an alleged irregularity in procedure before the agency. 
The order permitting the augmentation, however, is not relevant to the Court's Decision 
being appealed by the County. After distilling the County's eleven pages of argument, it appears 
that the County's sole objection to the augmentation is that the parties agreed that the only 
evidence subject to the augmentation order - the deposition of Tom Bowman, one of the County 
Commissioners - could be cited to the district court in the briefing below. This agreement 
between the parties resulted from the district court's decision to bifurcate its judicial review of 
the Board's Decision. Specifically, the district court kept jurisdiction over the issues relating to 
the propriety of Poster's appeal to the Board of Commissioners (including the estoppel issue), 
and it remanded back to the Commissioners all issues relating to the whether or not the 
Commissioners acted arbitrarily or with bias in their determination that the Property was in the 
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MOD. Thus, nearly all of the materials that were augmented into the record related to the issues 
that were remanded. Since the materials do not relate to the Court's Decision, it is incredible 
that the County spends a third of its brief on h i s  issue. 
In any case, the County contends that the district court erred because it utilized one piece 
of evideuce &at was augmented into the record but not agreed to by the parties to constitute 
evidence that could be relied on in the part of the case that stayed in the district court's 
jurisdiction. This evidence comprised an affidavit from the Planning & Zoning Administrator in 
which she explained that she did not make a new determination of whether the Property was in 
the MOD when she reviewed the Rollins' building permit applications because it was the 
County's practice to treat prior administrative determinations as final. The district court cited 
this fact - along with many others - as support for why the July 6" zoning determination was not 
preliminary. 
While it is correct that the parties did not stipulate that this evidence could be relied upon 
during the district court's review of the "timeliness" issues, the County's claim that the Court's 
Decision should be reversed on that ground fails because it cannot show that it was prejudiced by 
its inclusion. Indeed, this affidavit simply confirmed what the face of the Planning & Zoning 
building permit review sheet already showed. The Review/Information Sheet, which was filled 
out and signed by the Administrator on February 11,2005, establishes that she was confronted 
with the decision of whether the Property was subject to the MOD. She checked the "no" box 
and then handwrote the following: "per Kelsey letter 7/6/04." Thus, in the non-augmented 
record, there was evidence that the Administrator confirmed that there was no need to perform an 
additional zoning review because that decision had been made on July 6,2004. Furthermore, 
there were several other dispositive reasons set forth by the district court justifying its decision 
that the July fjth zoning determination could not he treated as a preliminary decision. These 
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reasons include the fact that a decision can be appealed only when it becomes final - and the 
County agreed that Rollins' time for appealing the zoning dctcr~nination co~nmcnced on July 6, 
2004 and ended on July 26,2004. Thus, the determination was final -for both Rollins and the 
County. In addition, the district court relied on the fact that Rollins reasonably relied on the July 
6th zoning determination by spending significant sums of money to prepare the Property for the 
proposed development. Thus, the County could not reverse the Administrator's decision even if 
it could have been characterized as preliminary.6 
Since there was more than sufficient information to support both the finding that (1) the 
Administrator did not re-review the zoning determination when she analyzed Rollins' building 
permit application, and (2) the July 6" zoning determination was final as a matter of law, the 
County cannot establish any prejudice in this case from the district court's consideration of the 
Vignes' Affidavit. 
The County also objects to the district court's decision to augment the record even though 
it was remanded back to the County. As for this objection, the propriety of the decision to 
augment the record with additional MOD decisions should he considered if, and only if, the 
Court remands this case back to the district court and the Commissioners then proceed with a 
hearing on the portions of the case that the district court remanded to them years ago and that 
decision then gets appealed. At this time, it is not proper to ask this Court to decide issues that 
will likely never be relevant to the final resolution of this dispute. 
6 In addition to spending an inexplicable amount of time objecting to the augmentation order, the 
County also objects to the district court's finding that the Rollins' Property was not in the MOD. The 
County argues that the finding in the Commissioners' June 23,2005 Decision that the Property was in the 
MOD was supported by substantial and competent evidence. (Opening Brief at 30-32.) The district 
court, however, never addressed the issue of whelher the County's decision was substantively correct. It 
could not because that issue had been remanded back to the Commissioners with the augmented record. 
Instead, the district court found that the Properly was not in the MOD because the July 6" zoning 
determination, which made this determination, was a final decision. (R. at 266.) Thus, even if the County 
wanted to change its mind about the zoning on the Property, it could not do so because the zoning 
determination was final and Rollins relied on it. 
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VIB. TWIE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD ATTB3RNIEPISP FEES 
WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE AND JUSTIFIED. 
A. The Pee Award Was Justified Under I d a h ~  Code Section 12-1117. 
Following the district court's ruling on Rollius' petition for judicial review, Rollins 
sought an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code 512-117, which provides that, in any case 
involving a county as one of the parties, "the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorneys' fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." (emphasis 
added.) An award of fees is mandatory when a party acts without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact for two reasons: (1) to deter groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a 
remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden in attempting to 
correct mistakes agencies should never have made. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 
144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007). As set forth below, the district court awarded fees 
because it correctly found that the County had no proper grounds for allowing the Poster appeal 
to proceed, which caused Rollins to bear an unfair financial burden in attempting to correct the 
County's unreasonable interpretation of its own ordinances. 
In its order on Rollins' motion for an award of fees, the district couit made several 
findings that established the unreasonable nature of the County's conduct in this case. First, the 
district court found that Poster was never an "aggrieved" person under the definitions contained 
in the Blaine County Code and, thus, was not authorized to file an appeal of either the July 6" 
zoning determination or the building permits under Section 9-32-3. (R. at 442.) The County 
acted unreasonably in failing to interpret the Section 9-32-3 appeal process language with the 
other code sections that defined those persons that could be a statutorily "aggrieved." Second, 
after the County found that Poster could not appeal the July 6" zoning determination because he 
missed the twenty-day deadline, it was unreasonable for it to interpret its ordinances as allowing 
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Poster the right to bootstrap an appeal of that very decision to an appeal of a building permit. 
Finally, ihe district court found that the County acted u~ueasonably when it held that Rollins' 
reliance on the July 6" zoning determination was at his own risk because he should have lcnown 
that the Cou~lty might later change its mind. As the district court properly found, "Rollins had a 
right to proceed lawfully when lhe appeal time of 20 days had run, and the decision became final 
and no longer appealable." (R. at 442.) For these reasons, the district court found that the 
County's actions were unreasonable in fact or law and awarded those fees incurred by Rollins in 
connection with the district court action. Notably, the district court disallowed all fees and costs 
incurred by Rollins in connection with his attempt to obtain public records. 
The County, however, contends that it did proceed with a reasonable basis in fact because 
Poster filed timely appeals of the building permits. The County, however, never performed any 
reasonable analysis of whether or not Poster had a right under the Blaine County Code to file an 
appeal of someone else's building permit. Instead, it just summarily decided that Poster was an 
"aggrieved person" because he was upset by the zoning determination. Furthermore, the 
County's position that Poster could appeal the July 6" zoning determination afer  it had already 
found that such an appeal was untimely simply cannot be justified. It defies logic to interpret an 
ordinance as allowing a formerly unappealable decision to become appealable in the future. If 
such were the case, there is no reason anyone would seek a decision from Planning & Zoning 
prior to filing a building permit application. Finally, the County's claim that it cannot be 
estopped from changing the zoning determination because Rollins had no right to rely on it given 
that it informed him six months later that Poster planned to appeal his building permits just does 
not make sense. By that time, Rollins had already spent approximately $60,000 in reliance on 
the zoning determination and road permit he had received from the County. 
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In fact, the only explanation for the County's actions is this case is that the 
Coinmissioners succumbed to public pressure.7 The Coullty made its unreasonable interpretation 
of the County Code and forced Rollins to incur substantial attorneys' fees because the 
Commissioners received letters and emails from neighbors complaining about Rollins' project 
and asserting their belief that his property should be in the MOD. (See R. at 72-101.) Due to 
this public pressure, the Commissioners desperately tried to find a way to stop Rollins from 
doing what he had already obtained the County's consent to do. As a result, the Commissioners 
proceeded with a tortured interpretation of the Blaine County Code that cannot be justified.* 
This is the very type of groundless and arbitrary agency action that Idaho Code $12-1 17 is meant 
to deter. Instead, if the County wants to provide neighbors with a right to receive notice of and 
appeal Administrative decisions and building permits, it can amend the Blaine County Code to 
provide such a right. It cannot, however, use nonsensical interpretations of its existing code to 
stop approved projects that some people do not like. A property owner has the right to seek 
permission to develop a piece of property and then rely on that official permission. Without such 
a right, property owners would never be able to develop property without a constant fear of a 
government official deciding to change his or her mind in the future. 
B. The Fee Award Was Not Barred By I.A.R. 41(c). 
As another challenge to the district court's award of fees, the County argues that the 
district court lost its right to award fees when it did not address the issue in the Court Decision 
7 In addition, the composition of the Board changed on January 1,2006 when Tom Bowman 
replaced Mary Ann Mix. Tom Bowman had previously served on the Planning & Zoning Commission 
and professed an interpretation of the MOD that did not include a "bench" exception. 
8 The County contends that it acted reasonably because, if it had not allowed the Poster appeal to 
proceed, it would have been sued in district court by Poster. This argument, however, is utterly ir~elevant 
to the issue of whether it acted reasonably in fact or law with regard to Rollins. Indeed, had the County 
allowed Poster to seek judicial review of its finding that his appeal of the July 6' zoning determination was 
untimely, it would not have been subject to an award of fees to Poster because that determination was 
justified by the express language of the Blaine County Code. 
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on Petition for Judicial Review. Although Rollins requested an award of fees in his Petition in 
accordance with I.A.R. 41(c), the district court did not address the request in the Court Decision. 
Instead, after the Decision was issued, Rollins submitted a timely memorandum of costs and 
fees, which resulted in the district court's January 3 1, 2007 Order Granting and Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and Costs. (R. at 435.) The County contends that, because the 
district court did not address the issue in the Court Decision, it effectively denied the request. As 
the district court found, however, this argument is without merit. 
To the contrary, the district court found that, under Eacret v. Bonncr County, 139 Idaho 
780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004), it had the authority to modify the Court Decision and include a 
determination of a claimed right to attorneys' fees. Iu Eacret, the petitioners seeking judicial 
review of a county's land use decision requested attorneys' fees in their petition. In its opinion 
on the petition, the district court remanded the case baclc to the county and held that it would 
reserve its decision on the request for fees until after the remand. Months later, once the remand 
was completed, the petitioners renewed their request for fees and the district court granted them 
under Section 12-1 17. The Court, however, reversed this award because the petitioners did not 
timely file a memorandum of costs, as required by I.A.R. 40. Notably, the Eacret Court did not 
find that the district court was prohibited from awarding fees to the petitioner because it did not 
award fees in its ruling on the petition. Instead, the award was denied solely because no 
memorandum of costs was filed within fourteen days of the filing of the opinion. Id., at p. 502. 
In this case, Rollins did file a memorandum of costs within the fourteen day period 
mandated by I.A.R. 40. Therefore, the district court was entitled to rule on the request after it 
issued the Court Decision. Furthermore, as the district court noted, even if it should have ruled 
on the request for fees in the Court Decision, it had the right to modify it. As the Honorable Jess 
Walters stated in an article submitted to the Idaho Law Review, "in the event the appellate court 
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fails to state in the opinion its ruling on the question of the right to fees. . . ., the parties should 
immediately file a motion for the determination of the right to the award. This motion may be 
disposed of by the court with a written order without modifying the issued opinion, or a 
substitute opinion may be issued containing a decision 011 the fees question." Jesse R. Walters, 
Jr., A PrirnerfovAwarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, Idaho Law Review 17, 81 (2001). 
C. The Awarded Fees Were Reasonable. 
As its final challenge to the award of fees, the County argues that the district court should 
not have awarded the fees incurred by Rollins in obtaining evidence relating to the potential bias 
of the Commissioners and seeking to augment the record with evidence that should have been 
before the Commissioners. The district court properly rejected this argument because, since it 
allowed the augmentation, it found that such evidence was material and related to the validity of 
the agency action under Idaho Code Section 67-5276. Although the majority of the materials 
that were augmented were not actually critical to the "timeliness" issues addressed by the Court 
in its Decision, they did relate to the issues that were remanded to the Commissioners. As the 
district court stated: 
The fact that this Court's October 18,2006 decision caused certain remanded 
issues to become moot (such as whether or not the Rollins property was in fact in 
the Mountain Overlay District) does not make the augmented materials 
superfluous. It would be unfair to disallow attorney fees because counsel was 
thorough, although in hindsight the materials were unnecessary. 
(R. at 443.) Furthermore, it was the Commissioners' decision to employ an unreasonable 
interpretation of its ordinances to enable Poster to appeal the zoning determination and then to 
apply an interpretation of the MOD that was inconsistent with the manner in which the 
Administrator had been interpreting it in the same area. Therefore, the County should not now 
be heard to argue that Rollins should have done less to protect his right to develop his property. 
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The district court's award of fees to Rollins was proper under the legal standard, and 
necessary to deter similar unreasonable conduct by the County in the future. The award, 
therefore, should be upheld 
VIII. ROLLINS IS ENTITLED TO THE FEES AND COSTS HE INCURRED IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
In its Opening Brief, the County contends that it should be awarded fees below and on 
appeal because Rollins acted unreasonably by not succumbing to its unreasonable interpretation 
of the Blaine County Code and seeking a special site permit under the MOD regulations. This 
contention is absurd. Rollins did everything he was required to do to get a determination of 
whether he needed to get a special site permit. The County told him - in an official 
determination - that no, he did not need a special site permit. Instead, all he had to do was 
comply with the normal building regulations, such as height and setback restrictions. Given that 
response from the County, Rollins designed a residence that fit within that mandate. He 
prepared his site for a building that fit within that mandate. To claim that he could have avoided 
this lawsuit by going through what would have been an extensive review process that was open 
to the public, and which would have undoubtedly forced him to alter his design plans, is a blatant 
attempt to ignore the realities of the situation. 
Instead, fees must be awarded to Rollins for being forced, once again, to defend against 
the County's unreasonable interpretation of the Blaine Coulty Code. As set forth above, the 
County did not take an unbiased review of the facts in this case and determine the fair and proper 
procedure given the laws as they existed. To the contrary, the County searched for a way to 
secretly allow Poster to appeal the Administrator's zoning determination. In the end, although 
the search did not lead to a plausible interpretation of the County's laws, the Commissioners still 
allowed Poster to appeal. This decision has cost Rollins tens of thousands of dollars. An award 
of fees to Rollins under Idaho Code Section 12-117, therefore, is necessary and appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
For tlie reasolls set forth above, Respo~lde~lt Roll~~ls respectfully requests that the Court 
deny the County's appeal in its entirely and award attortleys' fees and costs to Roll i~~s for 
bringing an appeal that is not reasonably based in law or fact. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this & day of August, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this !k day of August 2008,I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing doculnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Timothy K. Graves 
Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2'Id Avenue, Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
A. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
- Telecopy 
cu"- 
Erin Farrell Clark 
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